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DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION
OF PRISON CONDITIONS
Grand jury investigation into general conditions at a state institution forming
a branch of the executive department of the Commonwealth was prevented recently by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in In re Grand Jury Investigation of
1
Conditionsat the Western State Penitentiary.
The case began with a petition by the District Attorney of Allegheny County, presented to the court of quarter sessions of that county, setting forth a recent
prison break and general riot among the inmates of Western State Penitentiary
at Pittsburgh, and requesting the court to call a grand jury to investigate conditions "presently and heretofore existing" in the prison. The court granted the
district attorney's petition, and refused a petition by the Attorney General requesting that the investigation be limited to crimes committed in Allegheny County.
On appeal the Superior Court granted the petition of the Attorney General.
Although the Attorney General's petition emphasized that the court of quarter sessions had no lawful authority to direct a grand jury investigation of the executive branch of the state government, the Superior Court's decision is not based
upon any immunity of members of the executive branch from proper investigation
by the grand jury, but rather upon the legal insufficiency of the district attorney's
petition to support the proposed investigation of the executive branch. For, in its
opinion by President Judge Rhodes, the court said a petition for grand jury investigation must be self-sustaining, and pointed out that the subject petition did
not allege commission of crimes by executive personnel but limited the allegation
of criminal acts to inmates of the institution.
On this basis, the decision is in line with earlier Pennsylvania cases cited by
the court. Grand jury investigation involving various officials of the executive
branch of the Commonwealth was permitted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in In re Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury.2
There, a petition by the District Attorney of Dauphin County for grand jury
investigation included various charges of unlawful irregularities in purchase of
materials by Commonwealth officials, unlawful use of Commonwealth materials
and workers so as to cheat the Commonwealth, and unlawful payments to certain
named Commonwealth officers for influencing enactment of legislation. Although
the petition was first found defective for failure to allege any specific crime, when
it was amended so as to state that the district attorney was in possession of evidence
and trustworthy information obtained from reliable sources, showing that the matters alleged constituted a system of crime, the Attorney General's petition for a
writ of prohibition was refused and the investigation was allowed to continue.
1 96 A. 2d 189 (1953).
2 332 Pa. 289, 2 A. 2d 783, 120 A.L.R. 414 (1938).
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The court did not suggest that members of the executive branch should be immune from criminal prosecution, but said: "Everyone knows, or should know,
that no citizen of our state or public officer is above the law. All may be punished
for criminal violations." Investigation by the grand jury was permitted as an aid
to such prosecution, since the grand jury is an arm of the criminal court, as our
Supreme Court had previously stated in McNair's Petition.'
As a formula for petitions requesting grand jury investigations the court
stated, in the Dauphin County case, "... there must be at least one specific crime
charged as part of a system of related crimes for discovery of which it is necessary
to have the grand jury's assistance."
In regard to investigation of government officials, the court commented in
the same case, "An investigation which properly concerns itself with violations of
the criminal laws in matters incidental to the conduct of government, and does
not merely inquire into the official acts of the governing power, is within the
power of the grand jury."
Hudson Bowlby
Member of the Senior Class
CRIMINAL LAW - PRACTICE - WAIVER OF RIGHT
TO UNANIMOUS VERDICT
Can one accused of a crime waive the right, inherent in the constitutional
right of a trial by jury, to a unanimous verdict? This question was recently presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Hibdon v. United
States.1
The Court, in answering this question in the negative, reversed the finding of
the lower court that such right could be waived.
The facts in the case were these: The defendant had been indicted on two
counts, and the jury, after having deliberated for twenty-seven minutes, reported
that they were unable to reach a verdict. The court inquired of the parties as to
whether a majority verdict would be acceptable to them. All agreed that it would.
The jury thereupon again retired and brought in a verdict of guilty on both counts;
nine to three on one, ten to two on the other. The defendant then moved to vacate
the sentence. This appeal followed upon the denial of his motion, thus presenting this particular question for the first time to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The lower court had based their decision primarily upon the decisions in the
cases of Patton v. United States2 and Adams v. United States.3
3 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 503 (.1936).
1204 F.2d 834 (1953) ..

..
2 281 U.S. 226, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1930).

8 317 U.S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942).
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In the former case, the United States Supreme Court had affirmed the unquestioned right to trial by jury citing the third clause of Article 3, section 2 of
thL United States Constitution as augmented by the Sixth Amendment thereto. The
Court listed the component elements of a trial by jury as: (1) The jury should
consist of twelve persons, neither more nor less; (2) the trial should be in the
presence of and under the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct
them as to the law and to advise them in respect of the facts; and (3) that the
verdict should be unanimous. It was held, however, in that case, that the defendant could validly consent to a trial by a jury of less than twelve men. Two
grounds were given for so finding. The first was that while the Constitution
guaranteed the right to trial by a jury of twelve men, it did not preclude an express waiver of this right. Secondly, that the reasons making mandatory a trial
by a jury of twelve under the old English common law, no longer existed. Thus
the right remains as one of which the defendant might avail himself if he so
chooses. Consequently, should he choose to waive this right, the court is competent
to accept such waiver.
In the latter case, it was also decided that a defendant could consent to a trial
without a jury if he did so knowingly and intelligently.
The government relying on these two cases urged that the Court apply their
reasdning to the instant case, thereby upholding the decision of the lower court
that, since a trial by a jury of twelve could be waived and, in fact, the right to
trial by jury could be waived completely, then this component element of the constitutional right to jury trial (i.e. the right to unanimous verdict) could also be
waived.
The Court, however, refused to accept this reasoning and it set aside the verdict of the lower court saying:
"The unanimity of a verdict in a criminal case is inextricably interwoven with the required measure of proof. To sustain the verdict by
less than all of the jurors is to destroy this test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, if one or more jurors remain reasonably in doubt as to his
guilt. We are of the view that the right to a unanimous verdict cannot
under any circumstances be waived, that it is of the very essence of our
traditional concept of due process in criminal cases, and that the verdict in this case is a nullity because it is not the unanimous verdict of the
jury as to guilt."
Since, as we have seen, the right to trial by jury can be waived completely, it
would seem apparent that one of its elements would be capable of being waived.
Yet the Supreme Court, seeming to ignore this, finds to the contrary.
Another point worthy of note in this case and one which possibly may have
influenced the decision was the fact that the waiver of a unanimous verdict was
suggested by the judge. The defendant at the time of trial was already in prison
serving another sentence and, if he were found guilty of the crimes charged in
this case, he would have to face the court for sentence by the judge who suggested
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the majority verdict to him. Under these conditions, it is obviously conceivable that
the consent was not freely given as is required by the cases for the waiver of this
right to jury trial.
It may have been this consideration which persuaded the Supreme Court to
overlook the reasoning of the Patton and Adams cases.
James M. Reinert
Member of the Senior Class
PROCEDURE - SERVICE OF PROCESS ON FOREIGN
CORPORATION - DOING BUSINESS WITHIN
THE STATE - MERE SOLICITATION
In the recent case of McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc. et a,1 the Supreme Court
of Utah held that mere solicitation-through the medium of television-by a
foreign corporation, did not constitute "doing business" within the meaning of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to service of process on a foreign corporation doing business in that state.2
The facts of this case are briefly as follows: At the end of certain television
programs, the defendant's spokesman invited televiewers to place orders for the
defendant's hair application by phoning the local television station. The orders
were then mailed from the local station to the defendant corporation without any
charge other than the regular advertising fee. The plaintiff, who had seen the
advertisement, responded to such invitation and received the corporation's hair
application, by mail (c.o.d.), from out of state. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of the use of this hair application. She served process on
the local television station's manager on the assumption that he or the station (from
which the defendant, a foreign corporation, purchased advertising time) was either
doing the business of or was in charge of defendant's office or place of business
in Utah within the meaning of that portion of rule 4 (e) (4), Rults of CiviL
Procedure, relating to service of process on foreign corporations doing business
in the state.3
In affirming the order of the trial court quashing service of process, thL
Supreme Court of Utah stated inter alia as follows:
"A hard and fast formula cannot determine algebraically every
case. Common sense must dictate the result. The law, in our opinion,
would be a faithless servant if today it demanded that solicitation of
business in and of itself subjected a foreign corporation to the local
forum. Of equal disservice to the common good would be the rule that
solicitation of business by television, radio, the press or in periodicalsUtah, 256 P.2d 703 (1953).
2 Utah R.C.P. 4 (e) (4): "Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for . . . . If no
such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defendant . . . does business in this state,
then upon the person doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business."
8 For the Pennsylvania R.C.P. in point see R.C.P. 2179 (a).
I -
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with nothing more, clothed such medium of advertising with the raiment
of a process agent. 4... This is not to say that in a proper case solicitation
plus something else, or use of radio plus something else, could not constitute doing business in the jurisdictional sense, or could not ascribe to
such advertising medium the role of process agent under our rules. The
test goes to the 'something else.' Somewhere a line is to be drawn and
the courts judiciously must mark it. To date the pattern, which in a changing world is ever changing, excludes solicitation alone as justifying jurisdiction conferred. Beyond such solicitation the activity to confer jurisdiction must be of sufficient substance and of such scope and variety as
would lead a court of last resort to conclude that immunization of the
foreign corporation against the power of our forum would be unrealistic,
unreasonable and a vehicle for oppressing or meting out injustice to our
own local citizens." 5
This case is in accord with the majority view. The authorities support the
holding that mere solicitation of business in a state by agents of a foreign corporation does not constitute "doing business" therein.$ This is true, according to the
majority view, whether the solicitation is only casual or occasional or is regular
and long continued.? On the other hand, some courts contend that foreign corporations should not be exempt from service of process where the solicitation of
business is continuous and systematic.8 Leo Frene et al v. Louisville Cement Company9 is illustrative of this view. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stated the following by way of dictum:
"It would seem, therefore that the 'mere solicitation' rule should be
abandoned when the soliciting activity is a regular, continuous and sustained course of business. . . .It constitutes, in the practical sense, both
'doing business' and 'transacting business,' and should do so in the legal
sense. Although the rule has not been clearly and expressly repudiated
by the Supreme Court, its integrity has been much impaired by the decisions which sustain jurisdiction when very little more than 'mere solicitation' is done."1 0
The Pennsylvania courts are in accord with the rule that mere solicitation of
business does not constitute "doing business" even where such solicitation is continuous and has extended over a long period of time. In the recent case of Pellegrini et ux v. Roux DistributingCo., Inc.,"1 our Superior Court reiterated the
4 256 P.2d at p. 704.
5 256 P.2d at p. 704, 705.
0 23 Am. Jur. § 381 at p. 380; 146 A.L.R. 941; 101 A.L.R. 126, 133; 60 A.L.R. 994, 1030; 95
A.L.R. 1478; 46 A.L.R. 583; 18 Fordham L.R. 204; 45 Mich. L.R. 218; People's Tobacco Co. v.
American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 62 L.Ed. 587, 38 S. Ct. 232.
7 Green v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 51 L. Ed. 916, 27 S. Ct. 595; People's Tobacco
Company, Ltd. v. American Tobacco Company, supra n. 6, 62 L. Ed. at p. 590; Mas v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., 34 F. Supp. 415; 146 A.L.R. 941.
s International Harvester Company of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 58 L. Ed. 1479; 60
A.L.R. 994, 1030; 46 A.L.R. 570, 572; 101 A.L.R. 122; see also: 39 II. L.R. 424; 29 Va. L.R.
950; 39 Ky. L.J. 357.
9 134 F.2d 511 (1943).
10 134 F.2d at p. 516; 146 A.L.R. at p. 933.
11 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A.2d 222 (1951).
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Pennsylvania rule as it had been set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
12
Lutz v. Foster& Kester Co.,:
"There must be 'other activities' in addition to the solicitation of business to make a foreign corporation's conduct the doing of business within the Commonwealth .... Such 'other activities' do not consist of acts
of courtesy performed by business solicitors without compulsion, in
order to satisfy or accommodate customers. Nor do they reside in the number of solicitors employed or the character and extent of the facilities provided them for carrying on their solicitation ..... The criterion is, rather,
authority to bind the foreign corporation
whether the local solicitors have
" is
by which they are employed,
The above statement of criterion was supported by further statements of th'e
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Lutz case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
pointed out that the important factor in Shambe v. Delaware & Hudson R. R.
Co. 14 and Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co. was that the orders obtained by the defendant's (foreign corporation) solicitors were not binding on the company until they
were received and accepted by it at its home office outside of the state.
The problems presented by the above cases are not limited to the situation
where an out-of-state corporation sends solicitors into Pennsylvania; these problems
also manifest themselves when a corporation domiciled in one county of Pennsylvania sends solicitors into another county of this state. In Philadelphia Gear
Works v. Read Machinery Co., Inc., 5 the Superior Court held that a corporation's
mere solicitation of orders and renting of an office for salesmen soliciting orders
or patronage for it in another county other than that of its legal domicile does not
constitute such "doing of business" as to render the corporation subject to process
in such other county.
As we have already seen, some courts contend that the "mere solicitation"
rule should be abandoned where the soliciting activity is a "regular, continuous
and sustained course of business." 16 This dissatisfaction is manifested even in the
opinions of some of the states which follow the majority rule. 17 Despite this expression of dissatisfaction, the majority view (as illustrated by this case-McGriff
v. Charles Antell, 'Inc. et al) seems to be firmly established as the rule in Pennsylvania. 18
Donald C. Taylor
Member of the Senior Class
12 367 Pa. 125, 79 A.2d 222 (1951).

18 84 A.2d at p. 224 quoting from 367 Pa. at p. 129, 79 A.2d at p. 224.
14 288 Pa. 240, 135 A. 755 (1927).
1; 139 Pa. Super. 584, 12 A.2d 793 (1940).
16 For an interesting discussion of what constitutes "doing business" for service of process as contrasted with domestication requirements, see 45 Mich. L.R. 218; see 61 Harv. L.R. 1254 for the
situation under the F.E.L.A.
17 See the concurring opinion of Wade, J. in this case (McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc. et al)

256 P.2d at p. 705.
1 Other fairly recent Pa. cases in point: Otto A. C. Hagen Corporation v. Empire Sheet & Tin
Plate Co., 337 Pa. 212, 11 A.2d 144, (1940); New v. Robinson-Houchin Optical Co., 357 Pa.
47, 53 A.2d 79 (1947), 52 Dick. L. Rev. 76; Law v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 367 Pa. 170, 79
A.2d 252 (1951).

